Every time there is conflict in Africa, the efficacy and utility of the African Union (AU) is called into question. Such criticism is made against the backdrop of resistance to overreaching interventionist policies by global superpowers (think the fairly recent anti-MONUSCO and anti-MINUSMA protests which were against United Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali respectively)—a policy which both civil society actors and political science researchers say has often been counterproductive to Africa’s development. Africa’s desire for greater autonomy is what led to the creation of the AU in the first place, with a mandate to find ‘African solutions to African problems.’ Many will agree that this mandate is not currently being fulfilled. The conflict in Sudan, tragic but not entirely unexpected, is another case where the African and Sudanese populations in particular would have expected swift action by the AU, starting with the negotiation of a ceasefire between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
However, the ceasefire agreement reached on 24 April 2023, was coordinated by the United States (US) and Saudi Arabia. In the official announcement of the agreement, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, referenced the coordination between the US and regional partners i.e. the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to enforce the permanent cessation of hostilities. The US, cautious of criticism over its interventionist foreign policies, referred to the AU’s decisive leadership in resolving the conflict. However, when one reads between the lines, it is clear that the status quo remains in place; with the US leading African actors by the hand. The peripheral part the AU played in the ceasefire has attracted fresh criticism. 60 years after its formation, the AU (initially called the Organization of African Unity) seems often unable to take a leading role in matters regarding the African continent.
AU AND THE SUDAN CONFLICT
Between 23 and 25 of April 2023, Comorian President (and AU Chair) Azali Assoumani led talks between leaders of the two rival factions involved in the conflict. However, the ceasefire was announced between those days, on the 24 April, which suggests that the agreement to stop hostilities was not directly related to the AU’s efforts (especially since the brief on the outcome of the talks came only a few days later, on 28 April). As for the peace negotiations that began in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 6 May, while there was public praise for the AU for the signing of the Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians in Sudan, there was no clear indication of how the AU’s interference was relevant to the agreement. The US and Saudi Arabia once again emerge as (more or less) successful mediators, in spite of their questionable neutrality. Both appreciate the geostrategic relevance of Sudan–US’s mediating role which diminishes potential responses from other key rivals such as Russia and China. Saudi Arabia has economic interests in the territory and a close relationship with the RSF, which supported the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen.
ULTERIOR MOTIVES FOR BROKERING PEACE
Despite several announcements of a ceasefire throughout May, the warring factions never strictly adhered to the agreed terms. In fact, violence flared up during this period, showing that none of the Sudanese parties had any real interest in a possible agreement, but only agreed to negotiate in order to court the favour of the two foreign actors, for whose approval as legitimate representatives of Sudan they are competing.
